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‘Meum and Tuum’; cybercrime as the negative externality of post-politics bio-politics 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to offer a critical analysis of the ‘violence of capitalism’ 
(Lazzarato, 2014; Zizek, 2009; Kovel, 2007; Foster et al, 2010) apropos of cybercrime. 
Deploying recent examples of ‘DIY Jihadi terrorism’ (Conway, 2012; Awan and Al-Alami, 2009; 
Veilleux-lepage, 2016), ‘School shooter fandoms’ (Duffet, 2013; Daggett, 2015; Cullen, 2015; 
Curran, 2012; Hellekson and Busse, 2006) and ‘Revenge porn’ (Bates, 2015; Calvert, 2013; 
Citron and Franks, 2014) we show how these forms of cybercrime are ‘externalized’-that is 
constituted as necessary costs of doing business- through the neoliberal methodology which 
Zizek (2014) apropos of Lazzarato (2011;14) has described as ‘entrepreneurships-of-the-self’. 
The purpose of such entrepreneurship is to ‘privatize the social and socialize the private’; that 
is to dichotomize subjects of capitalism into those who owe and those who are owed, through 
a new moral order of indebtedness (guilt, fear, shame, revenge and so forth) (Zizek, 2014; 
Lazzarato, 2011; 2014). 
Introduction: ‘Externality and capitalism’s ‘necessity of harm’  
Hayek (1973:101), invoking the economists’ lingua, introduced the concept of 
‘externalities’ to refer to the logic of business in which actions that are not manifestly 
intended to cause harm to others cannot become the subject of rules of conduct. Apropos of 
‘externality’, Hayek argued that ‘some harm knowingly caused to others is even essential 
for the preservation of spontaneous order’ (1973: 1101) so that, to take one example, the 
state, exercising its prerogatives through the law, is only interested in harms if they 
destabilise the (spontaneous order of the) system as a whole (and not necessarily because 
they are harms as such) (see also Ruggierro, 2013; Ruggierro and South, 2013). The law, 
for example, cannot prohibit ‘the setting up of a new business even if this will lead to the 
failure of another’, as Hayek (1973: 102) observed- or, to stretch the logic further, the state 
cannot intervene unless there is a clear case that systematic dysfunction threatens not only 
the whole of other systems, but the relationships of such systems to the state. In this 
articulation, law and legality incorporate a range of conflicting expectations so that the 
prerogative of the state- or a system of states- is to decide which one prevails.  
Blinded Manuscript (Without authors names and affiliations) Click here to view linked References
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In theory, this ‘experimental’ approach to the impact of business practices is 
unproblematic; it is not (always) possible or desirable, after all, to prevent all actions which 
are likely to harm some, while benefitting others (Hayek, 1973; Ruggierro, 2013). In 
practice, however, justification for the necessity or desirability of harm is usually 
accompanied by a view of the entitlement of the ‘other’(s) as a subject of constant review 
and change (Zizek, 2014; Lazzarato, 2014; Ruggierro and South, 2013). Hayek was already 
aware of this when, in his conceptualization of externalization as ‘the establishment of the 
precise boundaries within which action is acceptable’, he also cautions that 
‘externalization’ can also mean ‘the demarcation of a range of objects over which only 
particular individuals are allowed to dispose and from the control of which all others are 
excluded’ (Hayek 1973: 107). To put it in familiar terms, while democratized access to 
certain risky things may be justified by the prospect of collective gain, this alone cannot be 
enough to occlude assessment of how, in effect, such harms are distributed: Recent 
research on the harms of globalized capital (for example, Lazzarato, 2014; Zizek, 2014; 
Stiglitz, 2012) has for example outlined the differential and differentiating ‘price of 
inequality’ (from the collapse of the global ecosystem, to the threat of new species of 
diseases to the spread of psychosocial and neurotic disorders related to inequality). 
In this sense, violence is already staged in capitalism (Zizek, 2009; Lazzarato, 2011; South, 
2013) not only on account of its proclivity to exclude (Kovel, 2007; Foster et al. 2010), but 
because such exclusion constitutes ‘objective’ violence (Zizek, 2009) which is not only 
systemic, but also ‘normalized’. Capitalism, in nuce, is violent.  
While this analysis is not new, it is the point of contact it has with the distinction Hayek 
(1973) draws between meum and tuum (‘mine’ and ‘thine’) that should exercise our 
attention: As Hayek observed, while the social boundary-making concepts of meum and 
tuum encapsulate the law’s aim of merely preventing, as much as possible, the actions of 
different individuals from interfering with each other, such prevention may also function as 
the legitimating façade of social inequality. This is also Zizek’s (2009) reading of ‘objective’ 
violence: Mutatis Mutandis, laws are seized of matters only in tandem with considerations 
of the equation of power (see also, Kovel, 2007; Foster et al. 2010), or, as Kovel (2007) 
points out, laws (and policy) constitute the refraction of power through the spectrum of 
socio-economic interests. 
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The design of Meum and tuum is thus that of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’; those who are owed 
and those who owe. Apropos of cybercrime, there are, on the one hand, those who are 
placed outside the protective ambit of social justice, such as victims of so-called revenge 
porn who are blamed for their carelessness (Stroud, 2014; Linkous, 2013; Calvert, 2013); 
or the victors of online commerce, such as corporate tax payers who not only benefit from 
the ‘property’ posted on their sites by users, but also have the attention of the state and are 
protected through immediate outputs including through policy legal changes, or privileged 
access to tax havens(Zizek, 2014)1. 
‘Meum and Tuum’ and the entrepreneur-of-the-self.  
This logic of meum and tuum has recently been diagnosed by Lazzarato (2011) and Zizek 
(2014) as ‘subjectivation’, which involves the ‘privatization of the social’ and the 
‘socialization of the private’ through the deployment of debt as a tool of government. The 
aim of (debt) subjectivation, Zizek claims, is the construction of the individual as an 
entrepreneur-of-the-self through her transformation from a worker/labourer, for example, 
to a form of ‘personal capital’. This ‘financialization’ of citizenship (Lazzarato, 2011:23) 
means, for example, that one’s patterns of public or private services consumption 
constitute ‘investment decisions’, with one’s worth and desirability calculable alongside the 
echelons and prestige of spaces one inhabits. Here is Lazzarato: 
The dedication, subjective motivation, and the work-on-the-self preached by 
management since 1980s have become an injunction to take upon oneself the costs 
and risks of the economic and financial disaster. The population must take charge of 
everything that business and the Welfare State ‘externalize’ onto society, debt first 
of all. (2011:9).   
What Lazzarato is implying above is that, as the individual emerges as ‘capital’- and thus 
the subject of corporate manipulation- she is no longer viewed as a citizen (with state 
protection), but as a form of investment decisions (on the best anti-virus, the best web-
hosting site, the riskiest places to post online content and so forth) (see also, Lazzarato, 
2011). The implication of this shift from citizen to entrepreneur is thus that risks (financial, 
                                                          
1 But there is also a reversal of this logic, with the state and its citizens as victims (of costs of cybercrime 
which are transferred to them through utility bills and policing costs) or the state as a victim when it cannot 
count on the compliance of corporations (such as when the state needs to access important information to 
police or prosecute crime organized or perpetrated online. 
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ecological, and psychological) are outsourced from the corporation and the state (from 
insurance, to online markets to banking institutions and so forth) to the individual: Social 
protections are individualized (privatized) to align them to market norms (you are hacked 
because you did not do something you should have and so forth), and thus they are no 
longer guaranteed, but are conditional on the performance of the individual whose life is 
opened up for assessment (was your software up to date? Did you switch your provider?). 
At the end of this process, the individual emerges precarious, isolated and subject to 
‘governance’ through fear (Zizek, 2012) has diagnosed as post-politics bio-politics2: The 
individual is blamed for his condition (unemployment, stress, bad credit, loss of privacy) 
but also encouraged to take personal responsibility, to show some guilt, to take some 
action, against the object of her fear (cybercrime, refugees, terrorists and other 
undesirables). As Lazzarato argues, 
The subjective achievements neoliberalism had promised (‘’everyone a shareholder, 
everyone an owner, everyone an entrepreneur’’) have plunged us into existential 
condition of the indebted man, at once responsible and guilty for his particular fate’ 
(2011:9)  
To understand the import of the above, however, we must understand Lazzarato’s 
conceptualization of ‘indebtedness’. For Lazzarato, debt reaches beyond ‘money owed’, 
encompassing all aspects of subjectivation (such as the guilt of not meeting social 
expectations and so forth) which, as he argues, the machinery of state-corporate symbiosis 
exists to extract: 
Debt acts as a ‘capture, and ‘predation’ and ‘extraction’ machine on the whole of 
society, as an instrument for macroeconomic prescription and management, and as 
a mechanism for income redistribution. It also functions as a mechanism for the 
production and ‘government’ of collective and individual subjectivities…Debt 
produces a specific morality…The morality of debt results in moralization of the 
                                                          
2 Zizek (2014) defines ‘post-political bio-politics’ as a type of politics (and economics) which claims to ‘leave 
everything behind’ (old ideological struggles, old injustices…) to achieve the primary goal of the efficient 
administration of life (pp. 34). The purpose of post-political bio-politics, Zizek argues, is objectification of 
social life, so that it can be administered through fear: Instead of radical emancipation, the political subject is 
encouraged to accept and move on (forget apartheid, forget the stolen money in offshore accounts; just create 
a conducive environment for investors; acquire new voting machines; arm yourself with the latest 
software…). 
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unemployed,  the ‘assisted’, the users of services, as well as entire populations…The 
media and politicians have only one message to communicate: ‘You are at fault’, You 
are guilty’ (2011:42). 
Let us see, below, how post-politics bio-politics extracts this debt apropos of cybercrime.  
The cyberworld as post-politics bio-politics 
In tandem with Zizek (2014) and Lazzarato (2011) it is possible to conceptualize the 
cyberworld as the new site of governance through the new morality of indebtedness: 
Victims of internet fraud are constructed, not as collective victims of the failure of online 
market infrastructure, but as gullible and/or greedy individuals who did not take the 
appropriate steps required of them (such as buying or updating their ‘anti-virus’, reporting 
their victimization on time and so forth) (see also, Calvert, 2013; Laird, 2013; Kowalski et 
al. 2012). Isn’t contemporary emphasis on outputs (new laws, new legislations, new white 
papers…), as opposed to outcomes (such as the requirement for online service providers to 
notify and compensate victims of violence or fraud perpetrated on their infrastructure), an 
example of the ‘privatization of the social and the socialization of the private’? Indeed: In 
the present time, the internet has become, not only a place where the capable (conniving 
individuals, but also corporations) prey on their victims (Stroud, 2014; Wall, 2007; Moore, 
Yar, 2013), but also a place where perpetrators have been given the equipment and free 
access to a pool of potential victims (Quarshie and Odoom, 2012; Yar, 2013; Wall, 2007) 
Like other examples of externalized harms under so-called globalization (see, for example, 
Stiglitz, 2012; Aas, 2007; Gros, 2003), the harms of cybercriminality are experienced more 
in ‘developing countries’ (which, as a rule, have less technical know-how and resources to 
fight fraud but are under increasing pressure to open up their economies to global finance). 
As Quarshie and Odoom (2012) observe, it is difficult to assess, much less police, 
cybercrime in Africa, not only because of the weak framework of laws vis-à-vis the 
‘corporate veil’ of multinational companies, but also because such corporations only allow 
cross-jurisdictional boundaries to be crossed where investigations are in line with their 
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interests3. Where the company has something to hide (say, in terms of the weakness of its 
infrastructure) it may either construct breaches on its system as an ‘internal problem’ for 
its investigators, or only allow proceedings to take place in the jurisdiction of ‘applicable 
law’ (cue expensive trials in Western courts under Western laws) (see also, Ruggiero and 
South, 2013). This expensive undertaking dissuades states form even considering taking on 
powerful corporations choosing, instead, to allow the corporations to self-police4. As such, 
Quarshie and Odoom (2012) tells us, cybercrime laws in Africa are5 for example likely to be 
found at the bottom of the ‘priority list’ when governments are negotiating the terms of 
foreign direct investments6.  
The point not to be missed here is that, under the globalization of neoliberalism, 
cybercrime has emerged as the example par excellence of the externalized harms of capital, 
for example through the relocation of cybercriminals to jurisdictions/regions where the 
laws are lax or inadequate or where the investigatory capacity is moribund (see also, Aas, 
2007; Gros, 2003). These places encapsulate Gros’ (2003) ‘trouble in paradise’ hypothesis: 
They are defrauded of badly-need revenue, or become hot-beds of conflict, as the examples 
cyber-jihadi below show. They are also under-protected and under-compensated. The 
citizens of such ‘wastelands of globalization’ (Aas, 2007; Stiglitz, 2012) are on their own- 
neoliberal’s failed entrepreneurs-of-the-self. To take an example, Africa, which now has the 
                                                          
3 As a result, jurisdiction, extraterritorial evidence and international cooperation are added to the complex 
nature of fighting cybercrime. Yar (2013) argues that other issues of ‘where to prosecute’ and extradition 
might arise, as cybercrime may be recognized as a crime in one jurisdiction and not in the other. 
4 According to Wall (2007) although cybercrime affects a large number of victims, it is also a ‘low impact 
crime’. For Africa, it means, for example, that law enforcement agencies are always reluctant to pursue 
cybercriminals because of the nominal sum involved, say in fraud, or because of a lack of resources that are 
rather utilised to deal with real world crime, and to tackle more pressing economic problems. 
5 Because most African countries do not have laws covering cybercrime, it makes it very difficult for law 
enforcement agencies to prosecute perpetrators for an act that has not been defined in the penal code as a 
crime. Only five countries (Cameroon, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa and Zambia) out of fifty four on the 
continent have laws on cybercrime (Global Centre for ICT in Parliament, 2014), with Nigeria and Tanzania to 
soon join the fight. 
6 There are other issues in relation to policing cybercrime for such countries, of course: Cybercrimes are not 
easily picked up by law enforcement agencies because they have little experience in dealing with cybercrime 
and the limited resources at their disposal can act as an obstacle in tackling the issue (Bande, 2013); law 
enforcement agencies have difficulties carrying out proper investigations because of the ‘no boundary’ nature 
of the internet; police officers are more accustomed to traditional crime investigating trends such as routine 
and physical crime scenes (hence they are less productive vis-à-vis ‘non-routine’ crimes) and so forth. 
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longest list of ‘failed states,7’is emerging as a new frontier of cybercrime8. Even then, in 
comparison to the spread of online-Jihad9 in the middle-east, Africa is a ‘walk in the park’. 
Let us see how, below. 
The online externality of post-9/11 anti-terrorism 
As recent critiques of terrorism have pointed out, the deployment IT techniques- for 
example the use of Twitter by the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (Friedland, 2014) - represents a 
turning point within global jihadist movements. There is, in the incorporation of cyber-
techniques into the methodologies of terrorism, a clear shift away from the highly 
organization-centric model (advanced by al-Qaeda, for example) towards one where 
unaffiliated sympathizers can interact with and, to some extent, shape propaganda content 
in real-time by actively participating in its further dissemination. Thus, what was once the 
problem of ideological and politico-economic ‘strains’ (Agnew, 2010; Cottee, 2010) is now 
the new normal of the ‘jousance’ of postmodern consumerism, where violence is staged and 
visibly consumed (Kailemia, 2016; Zizek, 2014).  
What happened? To what is this shift on account of? Veilleux-lepage (2016) has diagnosed 
it: The evolution of online Jihad occurred in tandem with the industry liberalization which 
was forced on large parts of the so-called ‘developing countries’ at the turn of the 21st 
century (see for example, Zizek, 2014; Moyo, 2009; Weimann, 2006). At that point the 
problems of terrorism were blamed on the technical backwardness of such places, with 
global multinationals pushing for liberalisation of key sectors such as banking, 
telecommunications and defence. As Weimann (2006) has also noted, the phase of 
‘modernization’ at the turn of the century meant that control of vital industry had shifted 
from the central government (obligated to provide security, but also enhance/direct 
economic growth) onto global multinationals (local shareholders and those from rich 
countries) who, as is standard, prioritized growth of the market, whilst conveniently 
                                                          
7 See for example, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ 
8 South Africa, to take one example, has consistently been placed among the top three counties with the 
highest cybercrime victims in the world (with Russia and China in the lead- according to the US ‘Norton 
report’ (see also, CNBC AFRICA, 2013, online) 
9 There is no consensus on what this term exactly means, or within which parameters it should be deployed. 
In our conceptualization, it merely denotes someone- or the idea of- violent Islam, also called Islamism. The 
intent is to refer to the idea or person who carries out or promotes violence  as a methodology of converting 
to or punishing non-adherence to the ideology of fundamentalist Islam.  
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abstaining from the ‘dark side’ of such market. In this sense, whilst the jihadist presence in 
cyberspace remained limited until early 2000s, the rudimentary platforms which sprang up 
after the market liberalizations laid the groundwork for the ascendancy of more 
sophisticated and interactive uses of the Internet in this century. The 2000s were for 
example characterized by the explosion of interactive content (and the connected user 
participation) in the form of Web 2.0 online forums (Weimann, 2006). At this point, users 
not only consumed online content but also actively contributed to its creation (Warren and 
Leitch, 2012; Hoeren and Vossen, 2009), translating to glorious profits for platforms such 
as Facebook, which followed shortly. As the profits and popularity of such forums 
increased, the role and power of the state decreased concomitant with the clout the 
corporations invoked (to the extent it suited them) on privacy and intellectual property 
rights; that is to say, the issue of privacy and rights predominated, not because such forums 
were ab initio champions of privacy and rights- after all, most of these companies underpay 
their workers and in any case make profits out of the property (such as videos and photos) 
of their owners (Zizek, 2014; Lazzarato, 2011- but because, in invoking the notion of rights, 
these corporations could get the backing of their powerful home states. 
Although matters were complicated by the dismal human rights record of the new frontiers 
of capital, the issues of rights were coincidental to the bigger logic of gaining and security 
an important market. As Zizek (2014) and Chomsky (2014) also acknowledge, the 
‘glocalization’ of capital allowed the ostensible emergence of ‘rights champions’ among the 
ranks of multinational internet companies, clearly rendering the logic of capitalist 
externalization: In order to secure their market base, such corporations staged an ‘online 
coup’ on such states, offering the space to ventilate or create which was hitherto occluded 
(but not extending the same space for a challenge on their market monopoly or their 
appropriation of the intellectual property of their users).  
The explosion in globalization of ‘online forums’ also coincided with the 2001 9/11 attacks: 
The post-9/11 period, Awan and Al-Alami (2009) and Veilleux-lepage (2016) show, was 
marked by a ‘shifting security paradigm’, with various groups of counter-terrorism hackers 
engaged in complex campaigns to disrupt jihadist websites. But, this only dislocated the 
online activity of jihadists, who began to decentralize their activity, for example from 
jihadist websites, which governments took down, to online forums (Awan and Al-Lami, 
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2009:57-58)10. This shift in paradigm is best embodied by the media strategy of Al Qaeda’s 
(AQ) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and lately, by the so-called Islam State (IS): In early 2004, al-
Zarqawi, utilizing the shift from Web 1.0 to the fully-fledged Web 2.0. (Conway, 2012), 
issued a video explaining who he was, why he was fighting, and providing details of the 
attacks he and his groups were responsible for.11 Subsequently, capitalizing on this 
newfound recognition, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) released a video titled Abu Musa’b al-Zarqawi 
slaughters an American, which depicted the beheading of the American civilian contractor 
Nicholas Berg (Conway, 2012). This video was uploaded to ogrish.com, a popular shock 
site, and was – as a result– viewed over 15 million times (Talbot, 2005). As others (for 
example, Maggioni, 2015) have pointed out, the video of Nick Berg’s beheading marked a 
significant change in jihadist propaganda, into the present standard script: Westerners 
kneeling down with Kalashnikov-armed [jihadists] standing behind them, beg the 
governments of the west to reconsider their foreign policy initiatives, such the invasion of 
Muslim countries or the release of Jihadis in jails and so forth.  
The point here is that, jihadist groups (operating in Iraq and elsewhere) seized on the 
power of easy-to-access video-sharing technology (and websites such as YouTube), but 
also the ubiquitous (but, deliberately hard to regulate) structures of online global 
commerce: Aided by the popularity of new media (and the fact that no Arabic language 
skills or high level of Internet literacy were now required to locate jihadist content), 
platforms such as YouTube rapidly became a significant platform for jihadist groups and 
their supporters, fostering a thriving subculture which they utilized for the dissemination 
of propaganda (see also, Veilleux-lepage, 2016; Conway, 2012). 
In this sense, the successes of the new media technologies have been built on their 
democratic nature, by the propensity of their entrepreneurs to place them, to an extent, 
beyond the reach and control of states. This, however, means that, while the corporates are 
                                                          
10 With the military successes of the US invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequently Iraq, the paradigm shifted 
further with the emergence and growing popularity of increasingly sophisticated Web 2.0 platforms, namely 
file-sharing portals and social networking sites (Conway, 2012). Here, al-Qaeda and its affiliates (such as al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)) began utilizing new developments in online media to disseminate downloadable content 
such as magazines, video and brochures. 
11 As a veteran of the Soviet–Afghan War, Al Zarqawi sought to legitimize himself in the eyes of the al-Qaeda 
leaders who did not wish to recognize his affiliation and role as the “manager of [al-Qaeda’s]Iraqi franchise”, 
as Maggioni (2015; 56) observes. 
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able to skim off the pay from this success, the harms of online violence are externalized to 
the victims (both user and non-user). Zizek has noted this ambiguity of ‘online 
communism’ when he observes that 
The very nature of the world wide web seems to be communist, tending towards the 
free flow of data- CDs and DVDs are gradually disappearing millions of people 
simply downloading music and videos, mostly for free…This free circulation, of 
course, brings its own dangers…this very openness gives birth to non-creative 
providers (Facebook, Google) who exert an almost monopoly power to regulate the 
flow of data, while individuals who create the content are lost in the anonymity of 
the network (2014: 54) 
DIY Jihad 
One of the results of the anonymity Zizek alludes to has been the emergence of the 
phenomenon others (such as Michael, 2013, and Veilleux-lepage, 2016) refer to as DIY 
Jihad. The purpose of DIY Jihad is to decentralize killing decision-making so that, on cue, 
umbrella outfits such as AQ and IS can reach their targets far and wide. Under DIY Jihad, the 
responsibility for carrying out attacks has been externalized to individual Jihadis who 
assumed entrepreneurial decision-making. This strategy has been most pronounced in the 
methodology of the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): In 2010, AQAP launched a 
widely distributed English-language online magazine titled Inspire, which encouraged 
individual jihad against Americans and Westerners (Michael, 2013). Inspire combines sleek 
ideological material packed with simple instructions aimed, as it claims, at ‘skill-building’ 
for the ultimate aim of bringing to fruition the so-called caliphate (see also, Veilleux-lepage, 
2016; Conway, 2012). In this sense, Inspire is the paradigm shift proper; it not only 
represents the proliferating ‘skills-building’ of radical Islam, but is also more effective at 
articulating the terms of violent jihad to English-speaking readers, by packaging it in terms 
familiar to their experiences.  
Michael (2013) and Veilleux-lepage (2016) correctly point out that electronic jihad is the 
most potent tool because of its power to assuage the cognitive dissonance of individuals 
who wish to advance the jihadist cause but are unable or unwilling to partake in actual 
conflict. As an example, through a section entitled Open Source Jihad, Inspire provided 
details of how to conduct a random shooting in a crowded restaurant or how to weld 
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blades to the front of a pickup truck to ‘mow down the enemies of Allah’ (as quoted in 
Michael, 2013; 55). Actually, since Inspire there have been a number of high-profile attacks 
on western targets, including the attempted decapitation of the marine drummer Lee Rigby 
in London in 2013, and the attempted bombing of Delta Airlines by the ‘underwear bomber’ 
Abdulmutallab12 (Kailemia, 2016). These and similar attacks were inspired by the strategic 
vision of Anwar al-Awlaki, a popular American-born cleric affiliated with AQAP, whose 
sermons were widely distributed on YouTube13. As Hoffman, (2010) has observed, this 
ability of terrorist organizations to motivate and empower individuals to commit acts 
outside of any chain of command, only using online material, represents a change in the 
nature of terrorism itself.  
What Hoffman is already aware of is the fact that, for organizations such as AQ, the battle is 
not just for their so-called caliphate, but also for the online market share: That is, in order 
to achieve the social objective (of segregating their admirers), organizations such as IS and 
AQ increasingly rely on the dissemination of their message uniquely effective social media 
strategy14. Organizations such as IS have developed and relied on a range of exceptionally 
professional and sophisticated communication and social media initiatives that are 
exceptionally easy to access and highly attractive to their audiences, including publishing 
ebooks and eMagazines and professionally edited videos15. This extensive reliance on 
unaffiliated sympathizers (who either re-tweet or re-post content produced and authorized 
                                                          
12 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/underwear-bomber-umar-farouk-
abdulmutallab-begins-life-term-7018630.html 
 
13 According to Veilleux-lepage, (2006), al-Awlaki and Inspire led to a fundamental shift in al-Qaeda’s strategy 
from organizationally-led jihad towards do-it-yourself terrorism. Similarly, Jarret Brachman (2014) claims 
that al-Awlaki and AQAP made do-it-yourself terrorism and its participants, the focus of their media efforts, 
rather than conceptualizing al-Qaeda’s sympathizers as merely an audience. 
14 IS’ Dabiq, for example, targets readers who are already interested in political Islam, but not necessarily 
already convinced jihadists. It attempts to ‘educate’ the reader on the caliphate’s aims, projects, and 
accomplishments. Similarly, IS’ “Black Flags Books,”- widely advertised on social media and jihadist forums- 
often uses infographics taken from Western media but presented from the caliphate’s perspective (see also, 
Lombardi, 2015). Such texts systematically organize information and are thus an effective propaganda tool 
which is easily accessible to those who seek out information about the so-called caliphate. 
15 On 5 July 2014, as an example, IS media group al-Hayat released in numerous different languages 
(including Albanian, English, French, and German) the first issue of its online magazine Dabiq, a publication 
reminiscent of AQAP’s Inspire magazine. With its slick and sophisticated production value, Dabiq defines itself 
as“a periodical magazine focusing on the issues of unity (tawhid), truth-seeking (mamhaj), migration(hijrah), 
holy war (jihad) and community (jama’ah). It also contains photo reports, current events, and informative 
articles on matters relating to the Islamic State” (as quoted in Maggioni, 2015; 71). 
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by IS leadership) has significantly driven up the usage of such media tools (Veilleux-lepage, 
2016, Michael, 2013). As an example, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the 
establishment of the IS ‘caliphate’, the message was uploaded on YouTube videos (and on 
the file-sharing website justpaste.it) before it was tweeted and re-tweeted millions of times 
by sympathisers (Veilleux-lepage, 2016). In similar vein ‘hashtag hijacking,’- which involves 
the manipulation of popular twitter ‘hashtags’ as a means of infiltrating conversations- has 
been deployed by repeatedly, most prominently during the Scottish referendum elections 
when IS (Using the Twitter handle al-Furqan) advised its sympathisers to retweet the video 
showing kidnapped British photojournalist John Cantlin  using the hashtag 
#Scotlandindependence (Vitale and Keagle, 2014). 
The effectives and uniqueness of such media is, to make an obvious but no less important 
point, built on the backs of the externalized harms which individual victims and society 
collectively must bear. Such strategies, aimed at gaining maximum exposure and 
overcoming the censorship of media such as YouTube, nonetheless benefit such media by 
driving up the traffic on their sites (even if this is not originally intended)16. The problem 
with this, as Zizek (2009) and Chomsky (2015) warn us, is that it normalises ‘symbolic 
violence’: The democratization of online media, while purely a good thing, also brings with 
it its ‘dark side’ 
Let us take another example. 
D-I-Y (Revenge) porn and the victim ‘entrepreneur-of-the-self’ 
 As Linkous (2013:3) has observed, the proliferation of new technologies (and particularly 
the ‘smartphone’) has made it easy and more appealing for people to create and distribute 
Do-It-Yourself Pornography’. In the last two decades a major problem has emerged 
involving unauthorised distribution of nude images, mostly as a form of revenge (Stroud, 
2014). Revenge Porn as a practice can have ‘detriment effects’ on the victim's lives17. As 
                                                          
16 In another example, a clip of IS’ film Flames of War, posted 18,034 views within just a seven-hour 
timeframe. 
17 The United Kingdom (UK) government has tackled the issue of Revenge Porn and in the Criminal Justice and 
Court Act (2015) which has a section specifically aimed at the crime of disclosing private sexual photographs 
with intent to cause distress. This works in tandem with EU law facility of the “right to be forgotten”, which 
allows a person to request ‘search engines to remove links with personal or damaging information about 
them’. However, as Bates (2015) notes, removal of search-engine link only makes the content harder to find, 
and does not necessarily mean that it has been deleted. 
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Franklin (2014: 1304) has noted, many of those who have fallen victim to revenge 
pornography have found themselves out of work, or forced to make major changes to their 
lifestyle, with victims even committing suicide. This is more so where, in addition to certain 
new media forums posting the pictures of victims, some (websites, for example) even offer 
visitors the facility of submitting their commentary on the images. Bates (2015: 63) shows 
how, in his study, ‘many participants experienced more severe and disruptive mental 
health effects, often being given official medical diagnosis of PTSD’. Bates also shows how, 
in majority of the cases victims have a ‘general loss of trust in people after being victimised 
by revenge porn, with many going from being very trusting to rarely trusting anyone’ 
(2015: 61)18. Citron and Franks (2014: 348) have observed, apropos of ‘revenge porn19’, 
how we should ‘no more blame individuals for trusting loved ones with intimate images 
than we blame someone for trusting a financial advisor not to share sensitive information 
on the street’. And yet the harms of revenge porn have been outsourced to the individual 
who, on top of falling victim to the crime, is also expected to take the blame and shame for 
not adequately preventing her own victimization.  
Revenge Porn, and its related version ‘sexting20’, are perhaps the clearest index of the 
externalization of the capitalist harm to the individual. ‘Victim-blaming’, which Bates 
(2015: 18) defines as ‘the act of unfairly accusing victims of contributing to their own 
victimization’ is the norm in revenge porn. As Bates argues, victim-blaming can happen in 
many ways, including subtle questions ‘asking a sexual harassment victim what they were 
wearing when they were sexually harassed, implying that if they had been dressed more 
modestly they would not have been harassed’ (2015:18. The standard response to ‘revenge 
porn’ includes the disparaging of victims as “stupid” or “slutty” (Bates, 2015; Linkous, 
2013). In one case where a Revenge Porn victim went to the police to get help the victim 
was told she ‘shouldn’t have taken the photo’ (Bates, 2015). This is reflected in many other 
                                                          
18 Altogether, wide research has that ‘cyber harassment victims’ anxiety grows more severe over time’; 
among younger victims of revenge porn victim have shown ‘lower levels of academic performance, lower 
family relationship quality, a number of psychosocial difficulties, and affective disorders’. 
19Revenge Porn has no clear definition because, as Bates (2015) explains, it may refer to all manner of non-
consensual pornography (including images captured without a victim’s knowledge, images of a victim’s face 
transposed on a sexually explicit body, or hacked images, or images uploaded by jaded ex-lovers’. 
20 This encompasses a range of practices which include the exchanging of ‘nude, semi-nude, or sexually 
suggestive images and text… via phones or on social network sites’ (Linkous, 2013). 
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victims’ reports about how they are dealt with many are told that ‘if they did not want their 
nude photos to end up online, they should not have taken them in the first place’ (Bates, 
2015: 18).  
The point not to be missed here is how apropos of revenge porn, little focus is placed in 
critical discourse on the role of online image security and how breaches of insecurity work 
in the reverse way; instead of damaging commerce (as would happen when corporations 
are hacked and data stolen, for example) revenge porn has a tendency to drive up the 
demand for the host so that, in a cynical twist, the gesture of breech serves the interests of 
the domain more.  
Let us, lastly, render further the dichotomy between ‘Meum and toom’ apropos of the 
externalized harms of cybercrime, through online school shooter fandoms.  
School shooters and online fandom  
A marked feature of postmodernity, Busse and Hellekson (2006:14) argue, is the 
emergence of online cultures over a shared appreciation or interest in a topic, with this 
shared interested specifically bringing together ‘fans’. As we also saw apropos of online 
Jihad above, the rapid commercialisation of the internet in the late 1990s made people 
realise that engaging with the Web was going to be a vital part of modern living. The launch 
of “Web 2.0” democratized the internet, ushering not only the individual as an self-
entrepreneur who could create and share their narrative with ‘followers’, but also fan clubs 
and fandom cultures which had hitherto interacted through radio and magazines (Nayar, 
2010).  
As Nayar argues, fandoms are a community of people built around a collective appreciation 
of “a star”. In this sense, joining a fandom constitutes a form of ‘space recovery’ from social 
and also economic isolation21. It may also, as Duffet (2013) has argued, evidence an avenue 
for self-isolation. As Duffet argues, the fluidity of modern identity-making engenders a 
                                                          
21 Some (for example, Bates, 2015) have actually claimed, the so-called ‘information society’, has weakened a 
sense of personal identity as society is bombarded by the media with suggestions of how we should be 
successfully living our lives in an acceptable manner e.g. through the right fashion, with a flawless face of 
make up or by aiming to replicate rich celebrity life styles. In other words, modern identity is based around 
consumable life-styles that people can pick and choose from to create themselves. 
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certain uncertainty so that online fandoms may be read as a form of escape from the 
plasticity of it all: Online fandoms may be a coping mechanism against the onslaught of 21st 
century consumerism. As such, those who struggle to find meaning (and voice) in the 
meaninglessness of post-politics bio-politics are externalized online (as the ranks of the 
depressed, distressed and so on) where they are preyed on even further, but away from the 
protective ambit of society (see also, Zizek, 2014). Those whom the imagery and symbolism 
of postmodernity isolates, Zizek argues, regain their camaraderie and reinforce identity 
online, even if fandom is the avenue to this end. The power of fandoms is thus that it 
provides the marginalized with new social codes and languages22 (Baym 1998) which are 
necessary for their new ‘virtual self’ (Zizek, 2009).  
But, the problem with the ‘virtual self’, the cyber-identity which is recreated, is that it can 
be completely different from real life identity: While the anonymity of the internet can be a 
good thing- for example where it allows suppressed identity (such as that of gay people) to 
be reasserted- it can also be a bad thing, especially when it provides a veil to conditions 
such as mental illness, anorexia or depression (or, in worse case scenarios, suicidal or 
terrorist drive) (Zizek, 2009; Bates, 2015). There isn’t a clearer example of this than school 
shooter fandoms. The thread that unifies online school shooter fandoms is their shared 
obsession with violent, online content: Pekka-Eric Auvinen (the 18-year-old ‘YouTube 
killer’ who murdered 7 pupils and the principal of Jokela High School in Finland before 
later committing suicide) had, prior to his crimes, posted a wide range of videos on 
YouTube, in which he sympathised with school shooters, ‘particularly those with a Nazi 
tinge” (Serazio 2010:428). Actually, just a few hours before his attack he even uploaded a 
video- entitled ‘Jokela High School Massacre—11/7/2007’ - where he described his plans to 
kill later that day.  
School shooters are thus another good example of the externalized harms of post-politics 
bio-politics: Where neo-liberal policies have succeeded in constructing the individual as an 
                                                          
22Zizek (2014) notes the existence of ‘resistance identities’ as ‘generated by those actors who are in 
positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatised by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of 
resistance and survival based on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the 
institutions of society” 
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entrepreneur-of-the-self to be rewarded, or shamed, concomitant to his participation in the 
circus of financialised consumerism (Lazzarato, 2011; Zizek, 2014), sometimes the 
‘chickens come home to roost’ in the shape those who rebel (albeit out of delusion) against 
this logic, with disastrous consequences. As Rico (2015) has shown, the columbine 
shooters, Klebold and Harris, claimed that they were resisting the subordination of 
“moronic” mainstream society which they rejected and looked down upon. Equally, 
fandoms which have developed in the wake of Columbine shooting often justify the heroics 
of Klebold and Harris by contrasting it to the pressures of a ‘rigged’ educational, economic 
or political system.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the frame of analysis deployed above is not new or unique: Criminologists 
and critical theorists have lately tended to engage with the ‘harms’ of capital (Lazzarato, 
2011; Kovel, 2007; Foster, et al. 2010), with growing literature highlighting, in particular, 
the ‘externalized’ harms of corporations (Stiglitz, 2012; South, 2013; Ruggierro, 2013; 
Klein, 2002). Such critique has singled out the issues of power inherent in access, 
exploitation and commercialisation of common resources, and how this constitutes, for 
those who lack such power, a form of subjectivation (Lazzarato, 2011; Zizek, 2014). This 
subjectivation has also been related to contemporary externalization of harms through 
transnationalization (under what is commonly known as ‘globalization’) (Stiglitz, 2012; 
Gros, 2003; Aas, 2007). The conclusion drawn is that the harms of postmodern capitalism 
(and specifically, neoliberalism) are borne, not just by the biological system as a whole (in 
terms of species loss, displacement and so on) but also by the multiplier-effect on health 
and safety (from conflicts and displacement over natural resources, corruption and loss of 
revenue, deaths from mudslides or diseases, from cancers, mental illness and so forth) 
(Ruggiero, 2013; Ruggiero and South, 2013) 
The main achievement of this paper has been to render the problems of (certain types of) 
cybercrime from a fresh analysis which is not boggled in ‘techno-speak’; that is, we have 
engaged with the sociological problems of cybercrime, demystifying it as a technical 
challenge which should be separated from its proper roots in the political economy. The 
main achievement is in rendering not just the isolating nature of communication 
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technology, but also how this isolation both breeds violence and is itself a form of violence. 
This is important because we have stepped aside from the usual obsession with subjective 
violence (of bombs and knives and guns) to show the systemic roots of this violence (in the 
structure of the economy and language) (Chomsky, 2014; Zizek, 2009), at least as far as 
online interaction is concerned.  
Of course space does not allow us to canvass all the points in relation to the political 
economy of technology, nor the harms of capital. We hope, nonetheless, that the small steps 
taken above will make vivid to the reader the extent and depth of online ‘ecological 
disorganization’, which Lynch et al. (2013:1) define as ‘the ways in which human 
preferences for organizing economic production consistent with the objectives of 
capitalism are an inherent contradiction with the health of the ecological system’. 
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